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In 2002, fourteen countries were candidates for accession to the EU. A large number of them 
were ex-socialist countries. The Treaty on Monetary Union (1992) imposed several criteria as 
conditions for accession to the Monetary Union, independent from the EU accession. The “Euro 
accession” essentially required compliance with budget, debt and inflation performances close to that 
encountered in the Euro zone. On the exchange rate side it imposes a period of nominal fixity just 
before the accession. The main question we want to address in this article is: have currency boards 
been an efficient tool to support convergence of inflation performances towards Euro zone 
performances, in comparison to other exchange rate and monetary strategies? Our assumption is that, 
because the currency boards create a quasi-monetary union, they are an efficient convergence medium. 
In order to provide evidence to support our hypotheses, we test a restricted co-integration model 
aiming at a long-run equalisation between local and German prices. The long-run relation facilitates 
the evaluation of the inertia of the price differential between candidate countries and Germany. In 
addition, the short-term dynamics provide some evidence regarding the strength of the convergence 
toward the specified long-run relation. 
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En 2002, quatorze pays ont été candidats à l’intégration européenne. Une grande partie de 
ceux-ci sont d’anciennes républiques socialistes. Le traité sur l’union monétaire, plus connu sous le 
nom de traité de Maastricht (1992), précise les conditions préalables à l’intégration monétaire qui sont 
à distinguer du processus d’intégration de l’Union Economique. Le processus d’intégration à l’Euro 
exige essentiellement une convergence des performances en termes de déficit public, de dette et 
d’inflation des pays candidats vers les performances des pays membres. Du point de vue du taux de 
change, la phase préalable à l’intégration prévoit la fixation du change nominal. La principale question 
à laquelle nous désirons répondre dans cet article et de savoir si les caisses d’émission (CBA) ont été 
un outil efficace pour soutenir la convergence des performances d’inflation vers le standard européen 
en comparaison avec d’autres stratégies de change. Nous supposons que le régime CBA a été un outil 
efficace dans la mesure où il créé avec l’Euro une quasi union monétaire. De manière à corroborer 
notre hypothèse nous testons les régimes de change au travers d’un modèle de convergence fondé sur 
une relation de co-intégration restreinte. L’équation de long terme nous permet d’évaluer l’intégration 
des prix locaux avec les prix allemands en longue période. L’estimation de court terme, en revanche, 
donne une indication sur la force de rappel du différentiel d’inflation vers son équilibre de long terme. 
 
Mots-clés : Caisses d’émission, transition, intégration à l’UME, tests de racine unitaire en panel, 
Bulgarie, Estonie, Lituanie. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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1.  Introduction. 
At the end of the 1980s, most of the socialist republics started a process of abandoning 
state-dominated economies and implementing market-oriented economies. Such a process 
appeared to be quite complex, especially on the monetary side. Indeed, countries had to issue 
stable currencies, independent of the rouble, without any central banking experience. They 
had to liberalise prices formerly fixed in a context of rationing and they had to facilitate the 
development of a sound and market-oriented banking system. A large number of experiments 
tragically failed. In 2002, more than ten of these countries applied for membership of the 
European economic and monetary union
1. A difference exists between the accession to the 
EU and to accession to the monetary union. For example a country could be member of the 
Union without belonging to the euro zone as Denmark or United Kingdom. Specific criteria 
are imposed on the “Euro accession”. In this paper, we focus on the price and exchange rate 
conditions of the Monetary accession. We shall investigate the efficiency of a special 
monetary regime, the currency boards chosen by three countries out of fourteen, in facilitating 
the compliance of the candidates with the European standard on prices. Using a panel co-
integration model restricted to a long-run convergence, we support the idea that price 
deviation in currency board candidates is among the lowest levels of inertia in the sample. 
Moreover, the short-run relation of the model provides us with an evaluation of the speed of 
convergence towards European prices. We conclude that CBAs curb monetary policy in order 
to comply with Euro standards. 
In the first section, we briefly present some experiences of monetary and exchange 
rate transitions and we explain how and why the one founded on currency boards may be 
better than other tools at facilitating monetary convergence with Europe. In the second 
section, we present some technical aspects of our tests.  
 
2.  Strategies of monetary transition. A special case: the currency boards. 
2.1.  Some problems of monetary transition (de Melo, 1997). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet centrally-planned economy was in ruins. 
Most of its members abandoned the Soviet vision of economics and tried to adopt a market-
oriented economy. We stress two exiting waves: the first concerns the countries of central 
Europe which are represented in our sample by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. The second wave came two years later with the CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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collapse of the USSR. It is represented in our panel by the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania. The second wave almost certainly experienced a more difficult transition for 
various reasons. In terms of currency, the three Baltic republics had to issue a completely new 
currency, which is a complex operation. The first years of the transition phase had certain 
detrimental consequences: most of the economies in transition experienced deep and often 
long-lasting recessions. On the monetary side, the rouble zone witnessed high inflation due to 
price liberalisation and money overhang (1991). Indeed, in a centrally-administered economy, 
prices are administratively fixed: they do not reflect the scarcity of goods and very often result 
in rationing. Price liberalisation thus leads to a surge in prices maintained arbitrarily low. 
Money in a centrally-planned system was funded on a mono-bank system, i.e. only one bank 
existed with specialised branches. This single bank was also the Central Bank, in the image of 
the Gosbank in the USSR. Consequently, all the money issued belonged to central bank 
liquidity. There was no distinction between central bank issue and commercial bank money 
since there were no commercial banks or any financial establishments other than the single 
bank. As money in the socialist view is only a unit of account, the single bank applied a soft 
budget constraint to state and state-owned enterprises. Credit allocation was not led by the 
interest rate or by the market, but by the central plan which followed an investment plan in 
order to meet production targets. In this system, the mono-bank was completely passive. As 
soon as a state-owned enterprise needed money, the bank would provide it without limits. 
This system caused a huge increase in the stock of liquidity. The price remained low only 
because of administrative controls; however, once the controls were removed the overhang 
caused high inflation. In order to avoid the destabilising effect of inflation of the rouble and to 
establish a two-tier banking system, with private commercial banks in cooperation with a 
Central Bank, the central and eastern European countries established independent monetary 
authorities. This process started around 1989. The scenario was worse in the ex-Soviet 
republics. Indeed, these countries belonged to a monetary union with Russia. When the rouble 
zone collapsed in 1991, they suffered payment suspension and central bank default in 
providing notes and coins. In these republics, where wages were usually p aid in such a 
manner
2, note rationing was not possible and they first had to issue a new currency 
independent of the rouble. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 i.e. for a complete list of the sample countries and country information see Appendix A 
2 Wage payment was the most important cash operation in socialist economies and almost the only cash 
operation effected by state-owned enterprises. Usually, all the cash of wages was driven towards a savings bank. 
At the end of the system when the wages started to increase much faster than production, an increasing share of 
wages was paid into unconvertible savings accounts (deMelo, 1997). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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The following table, extracted from Reinhardt and Rogoff (2002), present the 
historical record of exchange rate strategies used by the UE candidates countries. 
Bulgaria  May 2, 1990–December 1993 Freely falling/Freely floating/Dual Market 
January 1994–January 1, 1997 Freely falling/Managed floating 
January 1, 1997–January, 1998 Peg to DM/Currency Board/Freely falling 
January, 1998–January 1, 1999 Currency board/Peg to DM 
January 1, 1999–December, 2001 Currency board/Peg to Euro 
Reference currencies are US 
Dollar, DM and Euro. 
 
Cyprus  July 9, 1973–March 1992 De facto crawling band around DM Band width is +/- 2%. 
April 1992–January 1, 1999 De facto peg to DM Officially there is a +/-2.25% band. 
January 1, 1999–December 2001 De facto peg to Euro In January 2001, it was 
announced that the band width would be widened to +/-15% to be become effective 
in August 2001. 
Notes: Reference currencies are 
the US Dollar, the Pound 




September 1990–February 28, 1996 De facto crawling band around DM Band width 
is +/-2%. Officially tied to a currency basket and then changed to the ECU. 
February 28, 1996–May 27, 1997 De facto crawling band around DM Band width is 
+/5-%. Official pre–announced crawling band around DM. Official band width is +/-
7.5%. 
May 27, 1997–December 2001 Managed floating 
Notes: Reference currencies are 
the US Dollar, the DM and the 
Euro. 
 
Estonia  January 1991–June 20, 1992 Freely falling/Managed floating. There is no price data 
before this date. 
June 20, 1992–December 1994 Peg to DM/Currency board/Freely falling 
January 1991–January 1, 1999 Peg to DM/Currency board 
January 1, 1999–December 2001 Peg to Euro/Currency board 
Notes: Reference currencies are 
the US Dollar, the DM and the 
Euro 
Latvia  January, 1991–January 1994 Freely falling/Managed floating . There is no price data 
before this date. 
On July 20, 1992 The Lativian Ruble replaced the Russian Ruble. 
On October 19, 1993 the Latvian lats became sole legal tender. 
February 1994–August 1994 Peg to SDR/Freely falling 
September 1994–December 2001 Peg to SDR 
Notes: Reference currencies are 
the SDR and the US Dollar. 
 
Lithuania  January 1991–April 1995 Freely falling/Managed floating  
On May 1, 1992 the Talonas was introduced as legal tender. 
May 1995–April 1, 1994 De facto peg to US Dollar 
April 1, 1994–December 2001 Peg to US Dollar/Currency board 
Notes: Reference currency is 
the US Dollar. 
 
Hungaria  April 1, 1957–July 1, 1992 De Facto crawling band around the DM/Multiple rates 
Band width is +/- 5%. Officially pegged to a basket of currencies.  
On December 1, 1991 the basket was changed to comprise the ECU and the US 
Dollar with equal weights.  
July 1,1992–May 16, 1994 De Facto crawling band around the DM Band width is +/- 
5%. 
On August 2, 1993 the DM replaced the ECU. 
May 16, 1994 1994–January 1, 1999 De Facto crawling band around the DM Band 
width is +/-2%. At this time the weight of the DM in the basket was increased to 
70%. 
January 1, 1999–December 2001 Pre–Announced crawling band around the Euro 
Band width is +/- 2.25%. 
 
Notes: Reference currencies are 
the DM, the Euro, the Ruble 




January 1978–January 1, 1999 Moving band around DM 
January 1, 1999–December 2001 Moving band around Euro 
Notes: reference currencies are 
the Pound Sterling, US Dollar, 
DM, and Euro. 
Poland 
 
January 1988– March 15, 1989 Freely falling/Freely floating. There are multiple 
rates. Dollar. There is no parallel market data for this period. 
March 15, 1989–January 1, 1990 Freely falling/ Freely floating/Dual Market Parallel 
market is legalized.  
January 1, 1990–May 17, 1991 Freely falling/Dual Market Official rate is pegged to 
US Dollar. 
May 17, 1991–April 1993 Freely falling/Dual Market Official rate is set as a pre 
announced crawling peg to US Dollar. 
May 1993–May 16, 1995 Dual Market Official rate is set as a pre announced 
crawling peg to US 
May 16, 1995–February, 25, 1998 De facto crawling band around Euro. De facto 
band width is +/-5%. There is a pre announced crawling band around the DM and 
US Dollar that is +/- 7%. 
February 25, 1998–October 29, 1998 De facto crawling band around Euro De facto 
band width is +/-5%. There is a pre announced crawling band around the DM and US 
Dollar that is +/- 10%. 
October 29, 1998–March 24, 1999 De facto crawling band around DM/Euro. De 
facto band width is +/-5%. There is a pre announced crawling band around the DM 
and US Dollar that is +/- 12.5%. 
March 24, 1999–April 12, 2000 De facto crawling band around Euro. De facto band 
Notes: Reference currencies are 
the US Dollar, the DM, and the 
Euro. 
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width is +/-5%. There is a pre announced crawling band around the DM and US 
Dollar that is+/- 15%. 
April 12, 2000–December 2001 Managed floating 
 
Romania  July 1957–January 1990 Dual Market. There are multiple exchange rates—25 rates 
were applied to exports alone.  
On July 1, 1983 the number of rates was reduced to two. 
February 1990–November 11, 1991 Freely falling/Freely floating/Dual. Market CPI 
data available only from October 1989 
November 11, 1991–March 2001 Freely falling/Freely floating. 
April 2001–December 2001 De facto crawling band Band width is +/-5%. 
Notes: Reference currencies are 






February 8, 1993–March 1993 Freely falling. The Slovak Koruna is introduced. 
April, 1993–July 31,1996 De facto crawling band around DM Band width is +/–2% 
July 31, 1996–January 1, 1997. De facto band width is +/-2%. Pre announced 
crawling band is +/-5% wide. The official basket also includes the US Dollar with a 
lower weight than the DM. 
January 1, 1997–September 1997. De facto crawling band around the DM De facto 
band width is +/-2%. Pre announced crawling band is +/-7% wide. 
September 1997–October 1, 1998 De facto crawling band around DM. De facto band 
width is +/-5%. Pre announced crawling band is +/-7% wide. 
October 1, 1998–December 2001 Managed floating 100% of the observations remain 
within a +/-5% band of the DM/Euro. 
 
Notes: Reference currencies are 
the DM, the Euro, and the US 
Dollar. 
 
Slovenia  October 1991–February 1992 Freely falling There is no price data before this date. 
The Tolar is introduced to replace the Yugoslav Dinar. 
March 1992–March 1993. Freely falling/De facto crawling band around DM 
Band width is +/- 2%. 
April 1993–January 1, 1999. De facto crawling band around DM Band width is +/- 
2%. 
October 1996–December 2001. De facto crawling band around Euro Band width is 
+/- 2%. 
Notes: Reference currency is 
the US Dollar. 
 
Turkey  April 1981–March 22, 1983. Managed floating/Parallel market There are multiple 
exchange rates. On May 1, 1981. The lira was formally de–linked from the US 
Dollar. 
March 22, 1983–April 1984. Managed floating. Since 1984 the parallel market 
premia has largely remained in single digits. 
May 1984–January 1998. Freely falling/Managed floating 
February 1998–January 1, 1999. Crawling band around DM/Freely falling Band 
width is +/-5%. The crawling band is only detected with the 24–month window. 
January 1, 1999–January 2001. Crawling band around Euro/Freely falling 
Band width is +/-5% 
February–2001October 2001. Freely falling/Freely floating 
Notes: Reference currencies are 




In the great majority of cases, intermediate exchange rate policies based on pre-
announced devaluation, crawling bands or significantly managed float have been used. The 
extreme solutions are scarce. Free float had been used essentially in the case of Romania and 
Turkey, with some essays to manage the float. Fully fix arrangements are also limited to three 
countries adopting a CBA, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia which follows a strict peg 
to SDR working as a CBA without the institutional commitment. Why such a diversity? A 
clear trade-off appears to policy makers, on one hand nominal fixity helps to capture the 
anchor credibility in order to improve macro-economic stabilisation and, thus, disinflation. 
However, if governments desire a long lasting fixity they have to commit to convergence 
between the local prices and the international prices. In case of price deviation, the real 
appreciation of the currency lowers the country competitiveness that has serious real 
consequences. Well before the effect of real appreciation, a non credible commitment is 
subject to temporal inconsistency that provokes speculative attacks. In effect, strategies based CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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on nominal fixity had often known failures due to real appreciation and/or lack of credibility. 
In consequences, since 1960 to 1997 the part of pegged nominal exchange rate decrease from 
90% of the total exchange rate regimes to 50%, in favor of a surge of free or managed floats 
(Eichengreen 1999, Reinhart, Rogoff 2002).  In that respects the CBAs could improve the 
efficiency of the nominal fixity by making the fixity viable (see next section). We note that 
CBAs are not alone in the sub-region to run long lasting nominal fixity, Cyprus, Latvia and 
Slovenia maintain narrow bands or pegs without formal CBA. In case of a nominal peg 
strategy, the choice of the anchor is an important question. For example, the Lithuanian Litas 
was linked to the US dollar, on the contrary Estonia linked to the Euro (previously DM) and 
Latvia linked to the SDR. Recently, in order to support the EU accession, Lithuania changes 
its anchorage to adopt Euro as reserve currency. On the period, most of the peg, except 
Lithuania, had been linked to the Euro (DM) directly our through a basket shared between US 
Dollar and European currencies, mostly DM. 
On other hand, policy makers could let the nominal exchange rate be determinated by 
the market and they achieve macro-economic stabilisation by a conservative monetary policy. 
Such a strategy do not imply price convergence commitments, because the potential price 
deviation are compensated immediately by exchange rate variation (PPP). However, the low 
constraint imposes on monetary policy by the exchange rate regime is an incentive to 
inflationary policy. Economic policy observers note a “fear of floating” that to say a quite 
irrational aversion to float in addition of the real costs linked to nominal float. In 
consequences, a sort of medium choice is often made in mixing nominal fixation and periodic 
devaluations, as in crawling pegs or by important management of the exchange rate. This 
policy tries to capture both a part of the stabilisation and credibility effect linked to nominal 
fixity and to preserve the capacity to compensate prices deviations by exchange rate variations 
in order to avoid external unbalances. 
In the EU accession process we have to distinguish two steps. In addition of human 
right and political freedom requirements, the accession to the UE supposes to capture the 
community acquis of the union, mainly on commercial and legal side, without any special 
money or change mention.  In a second time, the new members, once they belong to the 
Union, could ask to use Euro as they legal tender. In that respect, the candidates have to meet 
some criteria defined in the treaty on European Monetary union (Maastricht, 1992). The 
article (121) fixes four requirements : price stability, debt suitability, exchange rate stability 
and interest rate convergence. In this paper, we focus in particular on price and nominal 
exchange rate stability. On the price side, the agreement asks for a lasting price stability and CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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explicitly for a inflation convergence as it requires a local inflation not above +1.5% of the 
European mean inflation the year before the Euro accession. On the nominal exchange rate 
side, the candidates could “not devaluate of it one initiative” that to say it has to fix its 
nominal exchange rate for at least two years before accession. In consequences, the exchange 
rate variations will disappear of the monetary policy tools and the monetary policy will be 
confronted to realise price convergence toward European prices in order to avoid disastrous 
real appreciation. 
 
1.  CBA in stabilization and convergence process. 
 
  We assume that a nominal peg is a more efficient strategy for EMU accession in the 
sense it meets the criterium of price convergence and come ahead the abandon of the nominal 
exchange rate alterations. In consequences, the countries using such a strategy are supposed to 
achieve early their price convergence and to be used to run its macro-economic policy without 
the nominal exchange rate tool. A pegged exchange rate is not however easy to run, it knows 
in particular serious drawbacks as the risks of time inconsistency and of real appreciation, as 
previously quoted. Our second assumption is that CBAs alleviate these difficulties. Indeed, 
the new CBA was designed to avoid the standard drawbacks of a fixed exchange rate. A new 
generation of Currency Board Arrangements (CBA), first implemented in Estonia, is now 
used to support transition. Firstly, the regime institutionally fixes the exchange rate by an 
institutional act. Secondly, it gives credibility for a large reserve availability by imposing a 
100% coverage of the central bank issues. The new design of the regime provides monetary 
authorities with certain discretionary powers, nonetheless within the limits of the full 
convertibility commitment and of the banking rule. The regime is thus somewhat more 
complex than it might appear. The balance sheet of the bank is divided into two departments: 
the issuing department and the banking department. The first is the standard currency board 
institution. It simply issues local currency in exchange of foreign currency. The second 
provides banking services: supervision, requirements and loans. However, the resources of the 
banking department consist of the excess reserves of the issue department. Indeed, the 
resources of the banking department are the reserve accumulates above of 100% of the bank 
issues and the profit on foreign reserves which constitutes the seigneuriage. They are 
important but clearly limited. In most cases, the CBA was chosen because it surely improves 
the credibility of the fixed exchange rate. Indeed, the institutional determination of the 
exchange rate eliminates the time inconstancy of the fixed exchange rate regime. The local CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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agents could clearly anticipate the exchange rate evolution because of the institutional 
commitment of the monetary authorities.  
In addition, the currency boards backing rule limits the base money counterpart to 
currency reserve. A hard budget constraint is thus imposed on both the public and private 
sector. In effect, the government and state-owned enterprises are forbidden to ask for central 
bank loans. In the same way the commercial banks cannot ask for a loan of last resort from 
the Central Bank. This aspect is quite important in a context of transition. Monetary transition 
consists, to a large extent, in hardening the budget constraint of the economy. In the case of 
Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent in the case of Lithuania, the monetary authorities have failed 
to tighten the budget constraint in particular for the public banking and enterprise sector. This 
default carries on from the former system. As the inter-bank market was non-existent and the 
Central Bank did not impose a hard budget constraint on the banking sector, the central bank 
acted more as a lender of first resort (Benlemann, M., Hristov, K., Nenovsky, N., 2002) 
alleviating all the banks’ liquidity needs, than as a lender of last resort, alleviating only 
systemic money market liquidity shortages. In Estonia, the early currency board system 
permitted an efficient tightening of the monetary constraint (Knöbl, A., Sutt A., Zavoico, B., 
2002). On the fiscal side, neither the local commercial bank nor the local savings market was 
able to provide enough resources for financing budget deficits
3. In the absence of monetary 
budget financing, the government committed to budget equilibrium. In effect, the budget 
deficit has always been low and compensated for in the medium-term by surplus. 
Consequently public debt, starting from 0% of the GDP in 1991, rose to only 5% ten years 
later. In comparison, public debt in Lithuania, which chose a CBA later than Estonia, reached 
16%. This low level of indebtedness illustrates the achievement of a tight budget constraint on 
the Estonian public sector and government. 
  The transition countries were closed to international markets and less developed than 
most of the European Union partners. The price of a large number of goods was thus 
significantly lower than in developed Western European countries. The opening process will 
tend to make the price level of this country converge toward the price level of European 
countries, at least for tradable goods. In addition, with growth and economic development, the 
price of non-tradable goods will also tend to rise, an evolution described by Balassa and 
                                                                 
3 The underdevelopment of local debt markets largely deters, in the first years of transition, external 
indebtedness except by public loans from international institutions. In other cases, such as Argentina, the CBA 
facilitates external borrowing and thus a growing indebtedness. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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Samuelson
4. In the absence of nominal exchange rate variations (devaluation) the 
convergence may provoke real exchange rate appreciation. In the same way, if the external 
demand f or currency on the exchange market is high, the monetary authorities could not, 
under a CBA, let the exchange rate appreciate
5 in order to avoid a boost of inflation due to the 
crowding effect of the capital flows. In a CBA, however, as in a monetary union, monetary 
conditions are driven by external balance. Indeed, a real appreciation could have two kinds of 
effect. First, it may reduce the price competitiveness of tradable goods and lower the 
profitability of foreign investment in the export sector, or non-tradable goods could grow 
more quickly. Second, the price of non-tradable goods could increase more than the price of 
tradable goods, pegged to the international market price. The profitability of non-tradable 
activities thus becomes greater than that of tradable activities, consequently resources are 
evinced from tradable industries which lose productivity and, thus, competitiveness. The main 
effect, finally, is for external accounts to deteriorate. In a CBA, the deterioration of external 
accounts immediately provokes a monetary contraction. The effect of the monetary tightening 
will bring the price down to a bearable level in relation to the anchor country. The regime 
therefore disposes of an automatic mechanism for monetary adjustment of the external 
balance, which makes price and interest rates converge toward the anchor performance. Often, 
some specific features permit a CBA to deviate slightly from the anchor. For example, in 
Estonia, the hard budget constraint on the public sector has resulted in the rapid growth of 
productivity which compensates for local inflation, higher than that witnessed in Germany, 
without loss of competitiveness.  
 
  In 2001, fourteen countries were candidates for European Union membership. Forward 
to the UE accession the European Commission fixed certain conditions for entering to the 
monetary union, especially in terms of inflation, interest rate, debt and nominal exchange rate 
fixation. These conditions were essentially aimed at making the candidates converge towards 
European performances. We argue that the CBA supports monetary accession in the sense 
that it provides a quasi-monetary union with the Euro. In effect, the wide opening in 
commercial and financial terms, assures the country adopting a CBA a rapid convergence of 
                                                                 
4 In short, the BS effect supposes that during the development process, tradable goods will naturally experience 
higher productivity growth than the non-tradable goods sector. The wages in the tradable sector should thus 
increase in correspondence with the productivity growth. The factor mobility is assumed to be large enough to 
transmit the wage increase to non-tradable sector wages and consequently to non-tradable goods prices. The 
process induces a real exchange rate appreciation. 
5 in the case of Estonia, only devaluation is forbidden. The Eesti Pank is, however, allowed to reassess the 
Kroon. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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tradable goods prices and interest rates towards those of the Euro zone, led by arbitrage on 
international markets. This quick adjustment, even if resulting in some short-lived inflation 
boosts, avoids perpetuating monetary instability and chronic inflation. After that, the 
monetary mechanism acts as a convergence force which prevents the monetary performances 
of the country from deviating from those of the anchor in the long run. In addition, the CBA 
supposes a strong fiscal commitment to equilibrium. Deficits are low, and compensated for in 
the medium-term by surplus. Consequently, the local deficits should respect the European 
budgetary rules. In the case of Estonia and Lithuania, which started with a 0% GDP debt, the 
total debt is still very low today.  
In the next section, we try to give some empirical evidence regarding these 
assumptions in order to answer the question: is a currency board an efficient tool to facilitate 
accession to monetary union? 
 
2.  Price convergence for Euro candidates : are currency boards better? 
 
  We have chosen to investigate only the question of price convergence. Other monetary 
indicators could have been studied, such as the interest rate. However, consumer prices seem 
to be more relevant to capture the extent of the monetary integration between the Euro zone 
and its candidates. Indeed, the local consumer prices will depend on trade and finance 
liberalisation, but also on the monetary policy and its credibility, though that the interest rate 
might be influenced more by short-term arbitrage on the capital international market.  
 
  Unit root test for price convergence between Germany and candidates. 
  Recently, convergence literature has been enriched by tests based on a panel unit root 
test. The idea is simple: the authors look for unit roots in the difference of a relevant 
aggregate between two places. If the difference demonstrates a unit root, this means that the 
difference between the two places experiences considerable inertia, i.e. the two places do not 
converge. These techniques are frequently used to estimate convergence and divergence from 
purchasing power parity, a question rather similar to ours. For example, authors (Kocenda and 
Papell, 1997, Nenna, M., 2001) test the stationarity of the differences in inflation between 
different parts of Europe; if the panel exhibits a unit root, this means that the difference 
between local price growth is permanent, thus the regions do not converge toward the same 
rate of inflation. They choose coherent regional sub-division in order to reflect a special kind 
of monetary or exchange regime and they test if the countries following such a type of CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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monetary policy converge or diverge from the remainder of the sample. Here, we only want to 
apply the same procedure to a consumer price level indicator between candidate economies 
and a Euro zone anchor. The most relevant Euro zone anchors seems to be the German price 
level in that Germany remains the most important economy of Europe and because for more 
than ten years it has been the monetary policy reference for the Euro zone. We thus use the 
difference between candidate price levels on a monthly basis from 1990 to 2001 with the 
German price level on the same basis and for the same period
6. Using the German price level 
guarantees a completely independent reference variable, which alleviates further statistical 
difficulties such as panel endogeneity. We can surely rely on the weak exogeneity of the 
variable. Our assumption rests on the fact that Germany is a major country compared to the 
candidates. The interest of the price level is to obtain the accumulated inflation performances 
since the beginning of the transition until the eve of accession. The variable of interest for 
each candidate, each period could thus be written: 
 
Yi,t = Ii,t – Ig,t   (1) 
  
Ii,t is the price level in the candidate country (i) in the period (t) and Ig,t is the price level in 
Germany at time (t). 
By construction, the variable Y i,t assumes a co-integration or long-run relation 
between local and German prices with a special restriction on the coefficient of the 
explanatory variable to one. With such a restriction, the model rests on the assumption that, in 
the long run, local prices should be equal to German prices at a means reverting or stationary 
deviation. We can also write the long-run relation of the model as :  
 
Ii,t  =  Ig,t  + ei,t  (2) 
 
Ii,t and Ii,G are two completely different variables. Previously, we check the order of integration 
of each country’s price level with de-trended Phillips Perron following an ERS
7 process. For 
each test, we implement a more complete specification with trends, intercepts and lags 
determined following the Schwartz criterion. Table A2, in the appendix, reports the results of 
these tests. Almost all countries, except the strange case of Slovenia, could be assumed to be 
stochastically non-stationary with a first order integration. We notice that the residual of the 
                                                                 
6 the indicator takes the value 100 in 1995. 
7 Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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long-run relation ei,t is equivalent to the price level differential Y i,t .Our variable is observed, 
thus is a price level difference, and is not estimated as the residual of a regression. If the 
convergence hypothesis holds, the restricted model (2) should be a good co-integration 
specification. Consequently, the deviation from equation (2), that is to say Yi,t  equivalent to 
ei,t, should be stationary in order to obtain the mean reversion feature.  
  Our purpose is not to check some relative PPP, in that case we have to add exchange 
rate in the relation (2). A PPP estimation diverges from the prices convergence approach in 
the sense that exchange rate variations are used in order to compensate price divergences. In 
consequences the PPP could hold without price convergence by compensating price 
divergence with exchange rate variations. In order to clearly mark the difference, we add a 
PPP specification of the following form. 
 
Ii,t  =  Ig,t  + NERg + ei,t  (3) 
 
  This specification rests on the assumption that the German price is the international 
price for the countries of our panel, in consequences the exchange rate with the euro (DM) is 
relevant to compensate price deviations. This specification is thus non adapted for a country 
as Lithuania which had been linked until 2000 to US dollar. Each variables are log variables, 
by the way if the exchange rate is fixed with the Euro (DM) the logarithm of NERg takes the 
value 0, the relation (3) becomes thus equivalent to the relation (2). In term of stationnarity, a 
fixed nominal exchange rate is obviously a stationary variable that could not make the price 
differential non stationary. On the contrary a non fix rate that compensates inflation 
differential is supposed to be non stationary. 
  For testing the price differential co-integration, we implement unit root tests based on 
Phillips Perron ERS method with the largest time series available for each countries since 
1980. As we use monthly data, we apply a systematic de-seasonalisation for price data. By 
screening the individual statistics, we could class the candidates according to the significance 
of their unit root. We could, thus, determine the group where the inflation differentials 
between candidates and Germany exhibit a clear inertia and the group where the same 
differential is stationary. Consequently, we could assess the group of countries for which the 
long-run equation as specified in (2) provides a good co-integration relation and the group 
where local and anchor prices are not co-integrated. The test carefully controls for the 
deterministic component. We assume that the deterministic component rests on a Balassa-
Samuelson effect which should be quite important in the context of transitional countries. Our CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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specification controls for individual specific intercepts and trend. We assume that the 
stochastic component rests on monetary activism and external punctual shocks which provoke 
an erratic evolution of local prices. On the contrary, the deterministic component is more 
relative to structural developments that appear unavoidable. The stochastic component, 
assuming that the external shocks are, to a large extent, common to the all countries in the 
sub-region, reveals whether or not the local monetary policy converges towards German 
monetary policy.  
 
Table 1. 
Inflation differential inertia for candidates compared to Germany for the period 1990-2001. 
Phillips Perron ERS stat.  Obs..  Prices convergence(1)  PPP (2)  Regimes 
Bulgaria 1991:03 2002:01  131  -1.52 (0.82)   -5.5 (0)  Free float to fully fix 
Currency : Dollar to Euro 
Bulgaria 1998:01 2002:01  48  -8.1 (0)  ..  Fully fix (CBA) 
Currency : Euro 
Cyprus  263  -3.3 (0.05)  -4.31 (0)  Crawling bands to Peg  
Currency: DM to Euro 
Czech   96  -0.55 (0.97)  -2.85 (0.18)  Crawling peg to managed float 
Currency DM to Euro 
Estonia  107  -7.5 (0.0)  -4.45 (0.0)  Fully fix (CBA) 
Currency: DM to Euro 
Hungary  249  -2.75 (0.25)  -3.66 (0.0)  Crawling bands 
Currency: DM to Euro 
Latvia  107  -6.6 (0.0)  -0.89 (0.95)  
 
Peg to SDR 
Currency: SDR & Dollar 
Lithuania  100  -13 (0.0)  -3 (0.13))  managed float to fully fix 
(CBA) 
Currency: Dollar to Euro 
Malta  259  -1.22 (0.9)  -4.1 (0.0)  Peg to moving bands 
Currency : DM to Euro 
Poland  163  -2.59 (0.28)  -3.48 (0.0)  Crawling bands to managed 
float 
Currency : dollar to DM-Euro 
Romania  120  -1.9 (0.5)  -6.7 (0.0)  Free float to crawling bands: 
Currency : dollar to DM-Euro 
Slovakia  96  -3.6 (0.0)  -2.5 (0.31)  Crawling bands to managed 
float 
Currency : dollar to DM- 
Slovenia  108  -6.7 (0.0)  -2.8 (0.18)  Euro -Crawling bands  
Currency : dollar to DM 
Turkey  263  -1.8 (0.68)  -4.6 (0.0)  Managed float to free float  
Currency : dollar and DM-Euro 
 
  For Bulgaria which lastingly implemented strategies different from that of a CBA, we 
distinguish the total period, 1991:03  – 2002:01, and the period under CBA, 1998:01  – 
2002:01.  The distinction is relevant only for Bulgaria which exhibits a reduction in the 
inflation inertia following the adoption of the currency  board. Regrettably, the CBA of CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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Bulgaria lasting since just 4 years, the period is not large enough to keep the country in our 
panel as a CBA representative. 
  The hypothesis of unit root in the inflation differential could not be rejected in the case 
of a group including Romania, Turkey, the Czech Republic, Poland, Malta, Bulgaria (1991-
1998) and Hungary. In these cases the co-integration, assumed in (2), does not hold. The three 
CBAs belong to the stationary group which also includes Latvia, Cyprus, the Slovak republic 
and Slovenia. Among convergent countries three use a fixed exchange rate regime based on a 
CBA. Of the three convergent CBAs, two initially implemented a money target and nominal 
float finally abandoned for a CBA, i.e. a fixed exchange rate. Latvia and Cyprus maintain a 
strict peg for a long period, Slovenia and Slovakia maintain them narrow bands with Euro 
(previously Dutch Mark), +/-2% for Slovenia, +/-5 for Slovakia. On the period the non-CBA 
convergent countries make their peg tighter to the anchor. Of the non-convergence cases, 
countries soften they exchange rate commitment as the Czech republic or Poland. They seem 
to use significantly their ability to change the nominal exchange rate in order to compensate 
price deviation. Indeed, controlling for the exchange rate level vanish price deviation for 
Malta, the Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Turkey. 
  In conclusion, it appears that significant price deviation between candidate prices and 
German prices has been recorded since the transition. Moreover, this price deviation seems to 
be lasting. The more efficient strategies are based on a nominal anchor strict enough, as the 
three CBAs. In the other cases, the ability to compensate price divergence is greatly used and 
seems to dissuade efficient convergence policies. The unit root test focuses essentially on the 
stochastic tendency of the variable, i.e. on the political, and not the structural, side of the price 
evolution. In this way, we find that the CBA belongs to a monetary regime which efficiently 
curbs local monetary policy towards the anchor’s monetary policy. 
   
Monetary convergence : the dynamic relation. 
In the following section, we provide an estimation of the dynamic relation linking the 
price level variation, i.e. inflation, between candidates and Germany. Indeed, the dynamic 
relation is defined as the Engle Granger second step, or the short-term relation corresponding 
to the long-term relation defined in (2). Consequently, we could specify our model as :  
DIi,t = ai +bit+ dis+ d1DIi,t-1 + d2DIi,t-2 +d2DIi,t-3 + j1DIg,t-1 + j2DIg,t-2 + j2DIg,t-3 
+ sei,t-1 + ei,t 
(3) 
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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DIi,t and DIi,g are the local and German price variations respectively. We tested earlier 
the order of integration of the price level Ii,t and Ii,g and assume that each one is integrated of 
order one, thus that their first difference is stationary. Consequently, the variables DIi,t and 
DIi,g are stationary or integrated of order 0 and we could thus use the traditional inference 
methods. Despite the assumed stationarity, we pay attention to the determinist component of 
the endogenous variable, local inflation, by adding to the specification an intercept, a specific 
fixed effect and individual time trends that are represented in equation (2) by a, ai and bit. 
These v ariables should capture the inevitable modification in price evolution that rests on 
structural developments. As the price data are monthly, we add to the specification (3) 
seasonal dummy variables, dis ,for quarter, half year and year, in order to control for possible 
seasonal price variations. 
How should the short-term relation results be analysed? We know that a strongly 
significant, negative coefficient, inferior to minus one, in front of the error-correction term 
signifies a good and reliable co-integration relation. If we refer to our assumptions about the 
long-term relation, good co-integration assumes long run equalisation between German and 
local prices, i.e. a one-to-one relation plus a stationary error term as defined in equation (2). In 
addition, the short term dynamic gives us the speed of the convergence. Indeed, the error-
correction term indicates the strength of the convergence force which curbs the short-term 
deviation back to the long-run relation. The following tables give the estimation of the short-
term dynamic for the two sub-samples, convergent (co-integrated) and non-convergent (non 
co-integrated). 
Table 2. Panel short-term relation between local inflation and German inflation. 
    Non-convergent sample (1306 obs.)  Convergent sample (836) 
       
DIi,t-1    0.21 (0.0)  0.069 (0.0) 
DIi,t-2    0.06 (0.0)  0.042 (0.17) 
DIi,t-3    -0.36 (0.0)  -0.41 (0.0) 
DIg,t-1    1.5 (0.0)  1.4 (0.0) 
DIg,t-2    -0.3 (0.5)  -0.19 (0.66) 
DIg,t-3    -0.74 (0.1)  0.11 (0.78) 
ei,t-1    0.0022 (0.818)  -0.10 (0) 
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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Table 3.  
Individual feature of the group estimation  
    Fixed effect  Error correction term allowed to 
vary across countries 
Cyprus  -0.12 (0)  -0.16 (0.0) 
Estonia  -0.12 (0.0)  -0.088 (0.0) 
Latvia  -0.13 (0.0)  -0.098 (0.0) 
Lithuania  -0.10 (0.0)  -0.2 (0.0) 
Slovakia  -0.12 (0.0)  -0.11 (0.0) 
convergent 
Slovenia  -0.12 (0.0)  -0.11 (0.0) 
       
Bulgaria  0.049 (0.0)  -0.0045 (0.7) 
Czech  -0.011 (0.6)  -0.018 (0.83) 
Hungaria  -0.0044 (0.83)  -0.0045 (0.0) 
Malta   -0.01 (0.5)  -0.047 (0.85) 
Poland  0.0034 (0.87)  -0.025 (0.0) 
Romania  0.041 (0.0)  -0.016 (0.0) 
Turkey  0.028 (0.16)  -0.0002 (0.95) 
Non 
convergent 
     
 
As expected, the convergence coefficient in front of e i,t-1 is non-significant for the 
sample that diverges from the long-run convergence relation defined in (1). On the contrary, 
the sample consistent with the relation (1) exhibits a strongly significant convergence 
coefficient, relevant to the good fit of the co-integration specification. The size of the 
coefficient is (-0.10) on a monthly basis, which represents a relatively strong convergence. 
The lagged inflation has a more important impact on the non convergent sample than on the 
convergent one, revealing the stronger inertia of inflation in the first group. On the contrary, 
external inflation, that to say German inflation, leads in a larger extend the local inflation in 
the convergent sample revealing this time a grater price integration of the second group. 
Between nominal peg, no specific exchange rate strategies seems to significantly 
accelerate or refrain c onvergence speed. Indeed, we note that Estonia and Latvia which 
implement respectively a currency board and a peg, have the most significant error correction 
term but inferior to the panel mean. On the contrary, Lithuania and Cyprus, which implement CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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also respectively CBA and pegs are above the panel mean. Furthermore, we could simply 
conclude that the CBAs are at least as efficient as other strategies that permit convergence 
with German prices. The four other convergent countries of the sub-sample, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, implement also a de-facto, if not de-jure, lasting peg and success to 
make it credible without specific institutional commitment. In some cases, as Cyprus or 
Slovenia, they could be help by specific features that induce a natural integration with the 
Euro zone. Nonetheless, the convergent countries, essentially those which use a currency 
board as a monetary and exchange rate strategy, have a greater opportunity to equalise local 
prices quickly with German prices than those which chose others strategies, whatever their 
specific conditions. 
 
3.  Conclusion. 
Monetary transition was founded on different strategies: some based on nominal 
exchange rate anchorage, others on more active exchange rate manipulations. This 
investigation does not aim to evaluate the success or failure of each one. We simply focus on 
the inflation differential with Germany from the perspective of accession to the Euro Union. 
In this context, nominal fixity seems to have a clear advantage in order to convergence toward 
the Euro monetary standard in comparison to more flexible exchange rate regime. In that 
respect the crawling or managed floats that aim to mix the advantages of both strategies seem 
to systematically fail to induce price convergences. The persistence of the ability to change 
the nominal exchange rate looks, thus, deterrent of prices convergence. 
One of the most important handicaps for each strategy is the difficult trade-off 
between monetary stabilisation and competitiveness. In particular, it was believed that 
monetary stabilisation could be achieved only at the price of a real appreciation, and therefore 
a loss of competitiveness. In this context, the CBA thus demonstrates certain specific 
advantages. First, it provides credibility to lastingly fix the nominal exchange rate. Second, it 
builds a quasi-monetary union. Indeed, it rests on an automatic monetary adjustment of 
external accounts that influences the price evolution following the variation of external 
competitiveness. Furthermore, it breaks t he stabilisation-competitiveness dilemma and 
guarantees price convergence with the monetary anchor.  
Our tests reveal that the CBAs belong to the best experiments in order to alleviate the 
inflation differential inertia with the Euro zone. In addition, we can argue that the CBAs 
essentially curb the monetary policy toward a low inflation bias, despite the perpetuation of CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.05 
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some structural price trends different from those witnessed in Germany, which can be 
explained by differences in the level of development and productivity growth.  
 
Appendix A1. 






Association Agreement  
OJ reference 
Bulgaria  1-3-1993  14-12-1995  OJ L 358, 31.12.94 
Cyprus  19-12-1972  3-07-1990  OJ L 133, 21.05.77 
Czech Republic  6-10-1993  17-1-1996  OJ L 360, 31.12.94 
Estonia  12-6-1995  24-11-1995  OJ L 68, 9.3.98 
Hungary  16-12-1991  31-3-1994  OJ L 347, 31.12.93 
Latvia  12-6-1995  13-10-1995  OJ L 26, 2.2.98 
Lithuania  12-6-1995  8-12-1995  OJ L 51, 20.2.98 
Malta  5-12-1970  3-7-1990  OJ L 61, 14.3.71  
Poland  16-12-1991  5-4-1994  OJ L 348, 31.12.93 
Romania  8-2-1993  22-6-1995  OJ L 357, 31.12.94 
Slovakia  6-10-1993  27-6-1995  OJ L 359, 31.12.94 
Slovenia  10-6-1996  10-6-1996  OJ L 51, 26.2.99 
Turkey  12-9-1963  14-4-1987  OJ 217, 29.12.64 
 
Appendix A2. 
Price level unit root test. 
Phillips Perron P-value  Lag (Schwartz 
criterion) 
Trend p-value  ERS de-trended 
level  First 
difference 
level  First difference 
Level  First difference 
Integration 
 order 
BULGARIA (130 obs.)  1  0  0.05  0.44  0.62  0.0  I(1) 
CYPRUS (143 obs.)  1  3  0.0  0.14  0.1562  0.0001  I(1) 
CZECH (128 obs.)  2  1  0.06  0.01  0.28  0.0  I(1) 
ESTONIA (119 obs.)  3  2  0.89  0.0  0.5255  0.0  I(1) 
GERMANY (143 obs.)  1  0  0.53  0.1  0.91  0.0  I(1) 
HUNGARY (155 obs.)  3  2  0.0  0.0  0.27  0.0  I(1) 
LATVIA (119 obs.)  1  0  0.97  0.0  0.397  0.0  I(1) 
LITHUANIA (115 obs.)  2  1  0.0  0.0  0.81  0.0  I(1) 
MALTA (143 obs.)  0  0  0.0  0.047  0.28  0.0  I(1) 
POLAND (155 obs.)  1  3  0.67  0.56  0.91  0.0  I(1) 
ROMANIA (133 obs.)  1  0  0.0  0.0  1  0.0  I(1) 
SLOVAKIA (128 obs.)  0  1  0.02  0.32  0.2786  0.0  I(1) 
SLOVENIA (120 obs.)               
TURKEY (143 obs.)  13  13  0.21  0.0  1  0.107  I(1) 
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